“Bioethics of the Dead”: an oxymoron

Abstract

The expression “bioethics of the dead” has become increasingly prominent in anthropology, bioarchaeology and museum studies. Yet its conceptual foundations remain unclear. This article critically examines whether the ethical frameworks developed for living persons can be legitimately extended to human remains. Drawing on both juridical considerations and philosophical traditions, we argue that bioethics is intrinsically concerned with living subjects capable of autonomy, consent, suffering, and moral agency. While legal obligations toward the dead persist in specific contexts, ethical duties regarding human remains arise primarily from their social, cultural, historical, and symbolic significance rather than from the continued existence of personal rights after death. Through engagement with Continental philosophical thought, particularly Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche, we suggest that the notion of a distinct “bioethics of the dead” is conceptually problematic. Respectful treatment of human remains remains essential, but such concerns are better situated within cultural ethics, jurisprudence, and heritage governance than within bioethics proper.